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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
As to the meaning of the word "transportation," the court has adopted the
common, everyday meaning as set forth in various dictionaries and as quoted
above; such a meaning is the only logical one to assume under the circum-
stances, since it does not violate the clearly expressed intention of the legislature
in such statutes. Upon consideration of the territory involved, i. e. the areas
within, or without, or into which, transportation is illegal, one meets with a
solid line of unopposed authority. The conveyance may be from one place to
another in the same city or town, State v. Campbell, 76 Ia., 122, 40 N. W., 100;
or county, State v. Arnold, 80 S. C., 383, 61 S. E., 891; or from one point on a
public highway to another thereon, Thacker v. Commonwealth, 131 Va., 707,
108 S. E., 559; or along a navigable watercourse as a highway, Pappenburg v.
State, 10 Ala. App., 224, 65 S., 418; or from a train to a depot platform, Liquor
Transportation Cases, 140 Tenn., 582, 205 S. W., 423. It is held that the convey-
ance must be from beyond the premises of accused in Sherman v. State, Okla.
App. 228 P. 1110; that it need not be from one person to another, but merely from
place to place, Asher v. State, 194 Ind., 553, 142 N. E., 407. One case holds that
a carrying from one part of a farm to another part, the whole farm being in
the accused's possession, is in violation of the law; but this holding was justified
on the ground that the liquor in that case was made at an illicit still on the
farm, while in the instant case the whisky was found in a shed, Scaggs v. Com-
monwealth, 196 Ken., 399, 244 S. W., 799. While in this country it is held that
the transportation need not be from a place outside the state to a place in the
state, McLaughlin v. State, 104 Neb., 392, 177 N. W., 744, in Canada, transpor-
tation within a province was not prohibited, 30 Can. Cr. Cas., 413. As to the
question of distance conveyed, the courts seem to hold that this is an immaterial
matter as long as the specifications as to territory are complied with, Berry v.
State, 196 Ind., 258, 148 N. E., 143, and Shirley v. State, Okl., App., 237 P. 627.
As to mode or manner of conveyance, the decisions are fairly uniform. The
transportation may embrace movement of the liquor in some vehicle under the
accused's control, West v. State, 93 Tex. Crim., 370, 248 S. W., 371 or move-
ment of liquor by accused on his person, State v. Pope, 79 S. C., 87, 60 S. E.
234, Burns v. State, 99 Tex. Crim., 252, 268 S. W., 950. Missouri, however, is
at variance on this point holding that movement on the person is not trans-
portation, State v. Jones, (Mo.) 256 S. W., 542, and a statute was enacted by
the legislature covering this point, Laws 1923, p. 242. Sec. 19, amending Sec.
6588, Mo. Rev. Stat. 1919. A taxicab driver who knowingly carries it is guilty
of transporting, though he didn't own the liquor, People v. Ninehouse, 227 Mich.,
480, 198 N. W., 973. The liquor may be in a carriage or aboard a vessel enter-
ing American waters, Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U. S., 100; or in a truck
which accused is leading in his own car, Sheffield v. State, 99 Tex. Crim., 95,
268 S. W., 162, or in any sort of vehicle. It can not, however, be in defend-
ant's stomach, Rush v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky., 206, 266 S. W., 1046. The fact
of ownership of vehicle used is immaterial, Melcher v. State, 109 Neb., 865,
192 N. W., 502; also, the fact that there was no definite destination, Thacker v.
Commonwealth, 131 Va., 707, 108 S. E., 559, and that the journey of transport-
ing was incomplete, Black v. State, 96 Tex. Crim., 56, 255 S. W., 731.
Thus it would seem that the Indiana decision is in line with the general trend
of judicial opinion, there being cases in practically every state which support its
doctrine, either in some essential feature or in its entirety. E. L. W. '28.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-LIABILITY OF A TENANT FOR YEARS FOR MATERIAL
ALTERATIONS IN THE LEASED PREMISES.-The lease in question was for a period
of five years and under its terms the defendant was to make "no unlawful, im-
proper, or offensive use of the premises, and to quit and deliver up the said
premises at the end of said term in as good condition as they are now (ordinary
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wear and decay and damages by the elements only excepted.)" The defendant
immediately took possession and began remodeling the interior and exterior of
the building. It did not appear from the record whether the alterations were
beneficial or prejudicial "to the inheritance." The bill was for an injunction
to prevent further alterations and the defendant appealed from a temporary
restraining order. Held, that it was waste even if the alterations were a bene-
fit, and the restraining order was affirmed. Stephenson v. National Bank of
Winterhaven, et al, (Fla., 1926), 109 So., 424.
The rule of the common law, and in a majority of the jurisdictions in the
United States, is that any material alterations of the buildings on leased
premises by a tenant for years, without the consent of the landlord, is waste
regardless of whether the alterations are beneficial to the owner of the rever-
sion. London v. Greyme, (1607) Cro. Jac., 181, 79 Eng. Reprint, 158; United
States v. Bostwick, (1876) 94 U. S., 53, 24 L. Ed., 65; Maddox v. White, (1853)
4 Md., 72, 59 Am. Dec., 67; Woolworth Co. v. Nelson, (1920) 204 Ala., 172, 85
So., 449, 13 A. L. R., 820. The reasons assigned for this rule are: (1) that the
evidence of title is affected by diminution of the means of identifying the
premises, Cole v. Green, (1672) 1 Lev., 309, 83 Eng. Reprint, 422; Brock v. Dole,
(1886) 66 Wis., 142, 28 N. W., 334; and (2) that by a lease the lessee is given
only a right of user in the building and the landlord is entitled to receive back,
at the end of the term, the very thing which he has leased, Agate v. Lowenbein,
(1874) 57 N. Y., 604; Hamburger and Dreyling v. Settegast, (1910) 62 Tex.
Civ. App., 446, 131 S. W., 639. The former reason seems to have been properly
discredited in view of the fact that in modern conveyancing property is de-
scribed by metes and bounds, or courses and distances, or with reference to a
plat or survey. Pynchon v. Stearns, (1846) 11 Metc., 304, 45 Am. Dec., 207; see
also the opinion of Lord Blackburn in Doherty v. Allman, (1878) 3 App. Cas.,
709. Though the doctrine of the principal case is in support of a rule of long
standing the modern trend of authorities seems to require that, in order to
entitle the landlord to injunctive relief or compensation for waste, it must be
shown that the alterations were of a prejudicial nature or that it will be im-
possible to restore the premises at the end of the term substantially as the
tenant received them. In Fred v. Moseley, (1912) (Tex. Civ. App.), 146 S. W.,
343, a case very similar on its facts to the principal case, the court refused to
issue an injunction against a tenant for years who contemplated changing the
leased store building into a moving picture theater. Doherty v. Allman, (1878)
3 App. Cas., 709 was a case in which the House of Lords and the Privy Coun-
cil refused to grant an injunction to restrain a tenant for years from converting
store buildings into dwelling houses, on the ground that the neighborhood had
changed so as to do away with any demand for store buildings. But in that
case the lease was for a period of 999 years and the length of the term was a
governing factor. T. S. '27.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Acr*. Claimant news-
paper boy was struck and injuried by an automobile after he bad completed his
delivery route, and was riding his bicycle on his way home, but was still within
the bounds of his district. He was not unnecessarily loitering, nor was negli-
gence imputed to him, and the question is whether his status at the time of the
injury and the place of the accident were such that he might come within the
provisions of the act allowing compensation to employes for injuries "in courses
of employment." Held, that claimant was injured on his master's premises "in
course of employment," since he was within the area prescribed as his working
district; that injury was not inflicted outside district because he was riding on
opposite side of bounding street, in accordance with traffic laws. Makins v
Industrial Accident Commission, (Cal.) 247 Pac., 202.
This brings us to the consideration of what constitutes "in course of em-
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